

Plato and the Development of the Form Schema

The Foundations of General Schemas Theory

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Polis as Court in Athens

In the last section we focused on Protagoras and his famous saying and how the concept of measurement by man may well have come from the courts themselves. We noted how pre-projection of spacetime, i.e. the courtroom, is a moment in the Relativistic framework that is instituted by the measurement process. However, we could only use this framework as a formal indication for the problematic of locating the mathematical or geometrical schemas. From that formal indication we need to focus in on the phenomenological manifestation of the schemas in order to uncover this subtle nuance of the overall projection of spacetime. We noted that Protagoras himself mentions the form (idean) schema in relation to his ignorance about the Gods. In this chapter we will see how Plato turns all of Athens into a courtroom and how he develops the concept of the schema form into the very foundations of the Western tradition

that is further elaborated by Aristotle. The key point is that it is the institution of the popular courts that brings about Protagoras' formulation of relativity, and which also unleashes nihilism in the city for all to see, in the form of the sycophant. Protagoras and the other Sophists get painted with this same brush and receive the fall out of the cities attempt to produce a pharmakon for the sickness of its logos in the courts. In effect, Plato begins to question the Sophists who for the most part cannot appear in the courts, in order to test their knowledge and the basis for their claim to be able to train citizens to protect themselves in the courts. Plato turns the city into a court where Socrates acts as the private prosecutor of the sophists themselves. But in doing so Socrates uses similar methods as Protagoras focusing in on Man rather than the cosmos and attempting to find stable definitions of fundamental things that the discourse in the courts are always referring to as commonplaces, which turn out to be empty variables with everyone interprets in their own ways. This critique is necessary because of the intense nihilism that becomes apparent in the courts which sucks the meaning out of important words that should be used as criteria for judging, but instead become open to myriad of interpretations that merely fit the moment and attempt to persuade the jury at any cost, even the cost of twisting fundamental words our of recognition. The court is a crucible for the refinement of logos but also of its deliberate obfuscation. In the refinement of the logos the non-duals show up as a possible third criterion which is neither rooted in man nor in the gods. It should be noted that the courts themselves are founded by Apollo. And it is Athena who casts the first tie breaking vote in the trial of Orestes. So it is assumed that the gods opened up the space of the court and laid its foundations. Since that time lost in the mythos the courts have proliferated and have become democratized. But in the democratized courts it is man judging man, not on the basis of oracles but on the basis of opinion of the jurors. So both men and gods are involved in the courts, and to Protagoras it appeared that man

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measuring man was the key operation that was occurring in the court. Socrates was told by the oracle that he was the wisest man, and ostensibly he went around talking to the sophists in order to prove the oracle wrong. What he discovered was that he was the only one that did not think he knew everything. His wisdom was the recognition of his own limits with respect to wisdom and the hubris of others like the sophists. But as Socrates applied his test to those who trained the litigators in the popular courts, he is really searching for another criterion to substitute for either man or god as the measure of all things. In effect he was searching for something beyond all the commonplaces, especially the commonplace of one and many. The whole question is on what basis can we make a non-nihilistic distinction and divide what ever issue is at hand in a way that is just. Eventually Socrates and Plato settle on the non-duals, i.e. an uncommonplace which is neither one nor many as the criteria. When we listen long and hard to the speeches that appear in the court, and at every attempt to win over the jury by what ever means, there is always an attempt to reach for a higher ground within the speech, the so called "higher angels" of the natures of the jurors as citizens and men of virtue. And thus within the logos we find glimpses of the non-duals when there is an appeal to law, as the ordering of human affairs. There is the appeal to the arte (rta) or excellence of men. There is the appeal to the good of the city. There is an appeal to the shared fate of the people in the city. There is the appeal to the source of the city, the first Autochthonic men who shaped the city. There is the appeal to the gods of the city which are its root, like Athena. All these are possible appeals which designate non-duals at the various levels of the hierarchy of opposites that define the Western worldview. Socrates and Plato seized on these designated non-duals which are ideals of the Western tradition as a source of the criterion that was beyond the one and the many. Where the sophists taught a technique of logos, the philosopher teaches of the existence of the non-duals by which we can see in the night of nihilism created in the courts.

In the courts these ideals become apparent by what the litigants appeal to as their higher natures. But also the litigants appeal to the lower natures of the jury. Litigants will appeal to anything that helps them win their case. But since the Litigants and Jurors are drawn from the same pool of citizens, appeals to the higher natures of the jurors show us what in themselves the litigants think are the higher natures of the citizens of Athens. Since it is dangerous to miss the mark in calling upon those higher natures, it is pretty sure that they are giving us a good representation in their speeches of the prevailing folk psychology. Socrates and Plato saw in the court proceedings both the extreme nihilism of the artificial extreme opposites waring in the medium of the logos but also the hints of the non-duals that were beyond one and many by which these nihilistic opposites secretly communicated. Non-duality is an escape from the empty commonplaces that become sucked dry of meaning in the endless chatter of the speeches. Non-duality stakes out an un-commonplace where meaning is preserved despite the intercene warfare between the feuding logoi. And that is what we find Socrates alluding to in his sketch of the Republic, especially in the celebrated passages that deal with the analogies of the sun, divided line and the cave.

The sun is the outward manifestation of the Good, because it is the source of energy off which everything feeds. The people in the cave when they escape see the inward sun of the source of the Good, which makes them see the nihilistic courtroom of the cave differently when they return. But the key analogy is that of the divided line. In the divided line there is a primary division between doxa and ratio. And within doxa, opinion, there is a division between pure opinion or appearances and grounded opinion or tested appearances that are realized to be forms and shapes of real things. This is the difference between the apparitions on the walls of the caves and the things that the sophists are holding up that make those shadows. Ratio is also subdivided into

representable and non-representable intelligibles. The representable intelligibles are like the fire in the cave and the non-representable intelligible is like the light of the sun outside the cave which is the source of the Good. Representable intelligibles are like geometrical figures and proofs. Non-representable intelligibles are the non-duals which cannot be thought directly but only indirectly. We cannot look directly at the sun, but only at things by its light. Representable intelligibles give us a certain amount of light, but it is nothing in comparison to the non-representable intelligibles which is the source of everything as is the actual sun for bodies, so it is that the Good is the source of the variety of the forms, i.e. differentiable kinds of things in the world. What is key here is to realize that these non-duals that appear in hints in the courthouse speeches as the Athenians attempt to appeal to their own higher natures, are all non-representable intelligibles like the sun of the Good. Like the sun of the good that means that there is the outward bodily aspect and the inward meaning aspect of the non-duals in each case. In other words there are actual Athenian laws that are written down that the litigants can appeal to, but the actual laws cover over the nomos, the inner nature of the law as an idea. That inner nature, or intrinsic nature of order cannot be seen, touched or defined precisely. All we can have in relation to them are formal indications. Similarly when we talk about justice, we know it when we see it, and every decision is an image of justice, but what justice itself is cannot be contained in any phrase or definition, it is ineffable. The same is true of right, of good, of fate, of sources, and of the root. All the non-representable intelligibles at what ever depth are known by the duals that they keep apart yet together at a particular level of abstraction within the Western worldview. They are only formally indicated as Heidegger is won't to do and cannot be defined. But they shine through the proceedings and give meaning when they are present, or they yield to the utter spiritual darkness of nihilism and meaninglessness when they are not present. In essence the whole teaching of Socrates through

Plato is about these non-duals that allow a basis for non-nihilistic distinctions to be founded on and discriminations to be made. Various Sophists fall into different nihilistic views the most interesting of which is Gorgias. It was the extreme of nihilism exhibited both by the teachers of logos and the litigants themselves that drove Plato and Socrates into the extreme limit that allowed them to see the possibility of the non-dual as a criteria free from the one or the many. Once they discovered the non-duals and their hierarchy related to duals at each stage of the unfolding of the worldview, then what opened up to them was a whole new way of looking at things which included an understanding of Special Systems Theory which Plato attempts to exemplify in many ways throughout his dialogues.

When we say that the non-dual becomes the criterion, we mean that the frame of reference is not set by a man or a god but by a daimon which is half way between men and gods. The daimon allows the distinction between the nihilistic opposites on the basis of the non-dual as a criteria. So instead of saying A is B for C where C is a person or a god one substitutes for C a daimon, i.e. something half way or non-dual between gods and men. As Plato says Socrates daimon does not tell him what to do but only what not to do. The diamond does that by holding up the criteria of the non-dual that is appropriate. For instance when discerning between logoi it might ask which has the best order, or it might ask which is right (rta) and most just, or it might ask which exemplifies the good better, or it might ask which is fated and which is arbitrary, etc. So frames of reference are not tied to the viewpoints of gods (jinn) or men but to the daimons, which are neither gods nor men, i.e. angels. And these better angels of our nature point to the criterion of the non-duals as a basis for making the measure of things, rather than the men or the gods. This escapes from the double bind of nihilism because the non-duals are the secret connection between the duals which must always be maintained and without which they will wither

away and die. All the duals within speeches are commonplaces, i.e. empty words, made empty by endless chatter, which serve as variables which can be particularized by the arguments in the logoi. But the commonplaces are ranged within the levels of abstraction in the worldview somewhere, and what ever the nearest dual, within the worldview, that dual is what indicates the relevant non-dual. Thus at a crude level there are appeals within the logoi to external evidence. If that is another speech, or a law it is an appeal to logos, but also there is an appeal to torture of slaves, and physical circumstances by which physis enters into the court room in other ways than through the water clock. Everyone in the courtroom are physically present, for instance, litigants, jurors, witnesses. Witnesses may be asked if their written testimony is true. There is a constant appeal to written texts in the speeches in the court. Those written speeches represent physis. The movement back and forth between logos written, logos spoken, physis enacted as torture, and physis as evidence in the form of circumstantial evidence reveals the non-dual of order in the midst of the court. That order appears as the written laws, but also as the necessary order in the court that allows the speeches to be heard. It appears I the ordering of the logoi themselves that gives them a grammatical and formal structure of words, sentences, paragraphs, etc. If we look at the situation in the court it is amazing how much of it we can explain with the ideas of energy/matter, space/time, and entropy/information from the point of view of physics and thermodynamics. However, that does not tell us much about the human scene. That human scene starts to become apparent when we raise our sights to the emergent level where human beings appear and we begin to see the kinds of order of physis and logos that we recognize as human beings. When we raise our sights to that level then we can invoke the work of Heidegger in Being and Time as a baseline for understanding what is going on if we want to avoid the traps of Cartesianism. But what is interesting is that we see both Heidegger's anti-cartesianism and Descartes view. The litigants

are examples of Dasein while the jury are examples of Cartesian subjects. The litigants are just coping as best they can doing everything they can to convince the jurors. It is the jurors that have internal private experience on the basis of which they decide cases on an unknown criteria. Plato wants them to substitute the criteria of the non-duals for their arbitrary personal criteria so as to escape from nihilism. So it is interesting that the difference between the litigants and the jury give us a model similar to that of dasein and the subject/object dichotomy. The litigants are in process their time being measured out, while the jury is semi-frozen on the edge of their seats and just listening, so that their difference also echoes the difference between the first and second meta-levels of Being, i.e. Process Being and Pure Being. The jury can be seen as being in a position like that of the men tied down in the cave. What Plato is saying is that the litigants on the stage are like shadows that are cast by the Sophists behind the scenes, outside the court room. As they are mostly non-citizens they are not allowed to take part in the proceedings. But they train the litigants and they prepare speeches for them to memorize. So it is really the Sophists who are behind the sychophants that appear on the court stage. The litigants are just appearances, the puppets of the Sophists. The question becomes how to move from the ungrounded opinion of the litigants that they express in their speeches, toward having a criteria for deciding the cases. Plato suggests that we must escape from the cave all together. First we must unbind ourselves, and then turn to see the sophist manipulating the appearances behind the scenes, then we will see that it is contrived by him what is seen on the stage of the court. We will achieve true opinion about the nature of the opinions that are expressed by the litigants. Then the freed juror must make his way out of the cave and see the actual things that were represented below in the light of day, this is the representable intelligibles. They are not just grounded opinion but are sure foundations as with mathematics and geometry. Finally one sees the sun, which cannot be looked at directly

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without blindness resulting, but which can be located in the sky as the source of all light and life. This Good is the production of variety as a cornucopia. It is goodness which cannot be defined but can be indicated which is the criteria that needs to be brought into play as the criterion in the court. Goodness is independent of men or gods. It being non-dual is like the daimons as being partway between man and god. Thus if we judge based on a knowledge of the non-representable non-dual intelligible of the Good then we will give good judgements, judgements that are fitted to the variety of the people that come before the court. What is good for one is ill for the other. Considering the greater good of the city, and the good for the individuals involved allows us to balance the good of the city against the goods of the individuals. This gives us access to pursuit of the appropriateness of the judgments. A similar thing could be said for each of the non-duals.

But lets return to the description of the court scene which separates litigants who are like dasein from the jury. Before entering the court these are all just citizens. One enters the court because a private citizen decides to prosecute on behalf of the city. Witnesses testimonies and tortures and other external evidences are collected prior to the trial in writing. All trials only last one day. A decision is rendered by the jury that is final at the end of the presentation of the two competing logoi of the litigants, prosecutor and defendant. The prosecutor goes first. Now if the litigants are placed in a position on stage like Dasein, that is to say that they are merely coping as best they can attempting to persuade the jury, but the it is the jury that has private experience and private criteria on which to base their judgment so that they seem to act as subjects. What is objective is the outcome, through the anonymity of the voting process. But to appeal to Heidegger, there is really three stages that need to be considered. There is the mitsein which is the being-with the others, and there is the Das Mann (the They or the One, as in one does such and such, and one does not do such and such).

The litigants standing together in front of the jury are an exemplification of mit-sein, while the jury is an exemplification of the Das Mann, man in general acting as a group. We can see that dasein can be seen as a dissipative structure, where the ordering of his speech before the jury is an example of negative entropy, and he hopes to spread his opinions to the jury as a media. But what the court scene does is it brings the two dasein into conflict by bringing them together on the same stage before the same jury in the same case. The jury is looking at the contrast between their ordering speeches and seeking to order their judgment based on what is presented to them. This is a model of the autopoietic symbiotic special system, of conjunction between two litigants with two opinions that are contrary or even contradictory with each other. The litigants each in their own way, by themselves or with help from Sophists behind the scenes, are appealing to Das Mann (They, One) which are the norms of their fellow citizens who have private experience and on that basis cast their vote which by quantitative addition of votes become an objective verdict. It is interesting in this sense that Das Mann contains the subjective and the objective together. It contains the norms that have forged the litigants and to which the litigants have to appeal. Das Mann is a model of the reflexive social special system. Here the Polis as a whole is considered the Open-Scape (meta/infra-system) and the citizen as householder is considered the system which exists outside the courts. The city is an operating system for citizen-households that act as applications running in that operating system. But the court is a special situation within the city, where the citizens may be stripped of their rights, property, or even lives. In that special intense situation within the polis litigants become dasein, and when together in linguistic combat display their mitsein to the Das Mann of the Jury who decides their fates on arbitrary criteria. The whole situation brings out nihilism but also shows up the non-duals and their significance for making non-nihilistic distinctions. So the courts in this view is a special enclave in which the Special Systems

appear in the form of the human relations set up between the players in the courtroom drama. Everyday the court was in session was a comedy or tragedy dependent on the case before the jury. Every day the court was in session (about 200 days a year) brought another measurement of the citizens and their behavior by other citizens. In that situation where citizens could be stripped of their property, rights and life citizens were turned into something more essential and basic which is their nature as Dasein enmeshed in their mit-sein confronted by Das Mann. The projection of the space of the court, the audience that is convincing, the fictive arguments meant to persuade, are all prerequisites of Dasein in this situation as a dissipative structure of opinions, which is engaged with another dissipative structure of opposite opinions attempting to infect the same medium of the listening jury, tied to their seats by the promise of a days wages paid for by the litigants themselves. It was dangerous for the prosecutor because if his case did not carry at least one fifth of the votes of the jury then there would be a substantial fine. But it was more dangerous for the defendant because his life, property and rights were at stake. But what is interesting is that this artificial situation takes on the form of the Special Systems and within its purview the need for the non-duals become manifest amidst the plethora of nihilism, where anything goes that will convince the jury. We see clearly that this situation is mirrored in Plato's analogies from the Republic which gives us the alternative non-dual route of using the non-duals as the criterion for judgement. Plato sees the Sophist standing like the Wizard of Oz behind the scenes controlling everything that happens in the court as the trainer of the sycophants. This is why Plato has Socrates go out into the city to confront and test the Sophists leading to the various dialogues so steeped in irony. The irony is seen as the antidote to the nihilism within the courts and the teachings of the sophists. But despite the irony of almost every statement of Plato which must be read in its full dramatic context, it is clear that what Plato is advocating is the

adoption of the criteria of the non-duals as non-representable intelligibles that can be a foundation for making non-nihilistic distinctions as a basis for judgement in the court. He does not take apart the framework of Protagoras but instead modifies it by substituting the daimons for the frames of reference rather than men or gods, and substituting the non-duals for the criteria that are advocated by those frames of reference. This has the interesting effect shifting the point of interest away from the viewpoints and their assertions toward seeing the non-representable intelligibles as background to everything that appears. This is called logocentrism by postmodernists. Note that in the court are both written documents and speeches presented. But the speeches take the stage and the written documents are seen as playing a supporting role. It is not as Derrida says that there is a total suppression of writing, but it is definitely subordinate. What is important is what appears in the speeches, especially the novel appeals. The courts are definitely logocentric, but the written texts are brought out and shown when the speeches of the litigants are stopped, or witnesses are brought forward to testify that their written statements are true. The important point about the logocentric is that presence as an aspect of Being is given precedence over the other aspects of Being. What is made to appear is the idea, which the speech is trying to get across, in each case. So the metaphysics of presence is seen in the very structure of the court. Citizens must appear, the jury must appear, witnesses must appear. They all appear together to each other in the structured procedure of the court proceedings which are set by tradition. The one element that does not appear is the Sophist who remains behind the scenes behind the sycophant, and this is what Plato objects to. But this is a parasitic element that is not meant to be there, but grew up as citizens tried to prepare for this ordeal in the courts before their fellow citizens. The role of the Sophist behind the scenes is an unintended consequence of the structure of the court within the city. There were many unintended consequences of the first public courts, like sycophancy itself, i.e. the use

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of the courts in ways they were not intended to be used. Hijacking the courts for political purposes, or to carry on feuds or vendettas.

Our key point here has been that Socrates and Plato too looked to the courts to give a concrete context to their practice of questioning the sophists, the one element which was hidden behind the scenes outside the courtroom. Protagoras saw in the courtroom the measuring of man by man in terms of his logos. Plato and Socrates saw that the Sophist himself should be measured by a meta-court set up within the whole city. Unfortunately the city itself had a hard time telling Socrates from the Sophists he sought to test. The whole city was the jury for Socrates and the Sophists and they could not make the non-nihilistic distinction between the philosopher and the sophist. Plato wrote his dialogues in order to make clear that distinction, but of course irony ultimately clouds the distinction and it is even hard sometimes within Plato's work to see whether there is a real difference between Socrates and the Sophists. But the answer that Socrates and Plato offer is non-duality as the basis for a criterion that is neither rooted in changeable man nor the unapproachable gods. But this does not disturb the framework of Protagoras as much as modifies its points of reference to diamonds and to non-duals as criteria. If we see the Special Systems as the basis of the vision of the non-duals in the court structure, then Plato extends this to the cities and he talks about different kinds of cities which exemplify the different special systems. So for instance the city in the Republic and Ancient Athens of the Timaeus are Dissipative Ordering cities, while the city of the Laws (Nomos) called Megara is the Autopoietic Symbiotic city, and the city of Atlantis, is the Reflexive Social City. These cities are measured by their distance from the sea. Atlantis is in the sea, The Republic and Ancient Athens is on the sea shore or close to it, and the city of the Laws is far inland and protected from the changeableness of the sea. If we look carefully at these cities we find that they are organized in very different ways that give us hints concerning the nature of the three

special kinds of systems¹. So Plato has taken the representatives of the special systems seen in the court and blown them up into imaginary cities so we can see their natures writ large on the entire polis. Plato's work is replete with images of the Special Systems because they are the models of the non-dual. To have a concrete picture of what he means by the non-duals he has to ground it in the schemas of the special systems. Just as in the courtroom the speeches transfer ideas and emotions from the litigants to the jury, and that the idea is built on the schema of the form, so the other schemas are there as well in the organization of the court room itself, including the schema of the openscape (meta/infra-system) which is seen in the Polis that surrounds the anomaly of the courthouse. Our concept is that all the schemas were present and embodied in the popular democratic court system if we look at them from the right angle, and that Plato is merely theorizing about this embodiment. In other words Ideas are not free-floating metaphysical principles but are in fact descriptions of the phenomenology of the anomaly of the courts within the Athenian Polis. So we can see the households headed by citizens within the polis as systems, then the citizen himself fits into the form schema. The pattern schema can be seen in the fabric of clothes he wears. So he stands before the jury in his clothes that represent his status as a man among men. The monadic schema consists of the slightest detail that might be noticed about the citizen before the jury. The polis itself is the environment, and the projection of that power beyond Athens into the hinterland and overseas through sailing ships. Each man has his craft or discipline that distinguishes him and consecrates him to a particular guild or domain within the economy of Athens. The sum total of all the projections of all the horizons of the Athenians constitute a world. Those horizons of the world of the Athenians reach out into the kosmos of the globe and of the stars in the sky of the physical world in which they lived. These are all schemas that come together in the

¹ See The Fragmentation of Being and the Path Beyond the Void by the author at <http://archonic.net>

courthouse of Athens of the third and fourth centuries BC. These and other schemas all appear in our way of looking at the litigants on stage in the courtroom before the jury. The schemas constitute various lenses at various scales or templates of understanding that we might apply to the phenomena before the jury in the courthouse. In a sense these are the scales at which men measure men and other phenomena of nature. Measurement implies scaling, without scaling one does not know how to bring the measuring standard into contact with the thing to be measured. We speak of human scale and the scales we are talking about are in fact projected upon the human body as determining the meso-scale between the micro-scale and the macro-scale of phenomena. Men measure men at the meso-scale, but in doing so they project the various schemas as the basis of measurement at the various scales that move off in emergent levels from the meso-scale of the human form. The measurement of man by man, i.e. autometron, implies a hierarchy of projected scale differences operable even in the courts of Athens beyond the system of the citizen-oikos and the open-scape (meta/infra-system) of the polis. It is these emergent scale thresholds that operate as templates of understanding each with their unique organization that will be the focus of attention in this book. They were operable in the courthouse in Athens as they are operable everywhere. What was unique about the courtroom of Athens was the way that it structured itself along the lines of the special systems as the center point between the micro-schemas and the macro-schemas.

Next we will consider the divided line moves toward the extremes of supra-rational and the paradoxical. Doxa intensifies in stages into paradox the mixture and fusion of opposites. But the ratio intensifies into the supra-rational which is the separation and non-mixture of opposites. The ultimate paradox is Being and the ultimate in the supra-rational is existence either interpreted as void or emptiness. Thus the divided line stretches from appearance away toward the non-being of existence or it stretches

away toward the ultimate paradox of Being in the other direction. The divided line itself brings together the three paths of Parmenides. In this way we can see it as a version of the framework of Protagoras.

The framework of Protagoras combines the three paths of Parmenides: Being, Non-Being and Appearance. Here Plato starts with appearance to introduce us to the Non-Dual step by step taking us through grounded opinion, representable intelligibles to non-representable intelligibles like the Good. These non-duals are founded on supra-rationality and are completely different from the paradoxicality that comes from going in the opposite direction away from appearance. For us Being is the Greatest paradox and Non-Being represents existence which is supra-rational. But this combination is difficult to see in the divided line unless you reinterpret it in terms of the lines themselves. It is interesting that it seems that no one has had the idea of interpreting the lines themselves previously. We interpret the lines by saying that the line that divides doxa represents outward existence or void, while the line that divides ratio represents inward existence or emptiness. Void was defined in Taoism and Emptiness in Buddhism as interpretations of non-duality. Our concept of the major divided line that divides doxa from ratio is that it is a deeper type of non-duality which we call manifestation. Thus in some sense for us the non-duality is hidden within the divided line and is pointed to by the discontinuities in the divided line itself. The intervals of the line are all descriptions of Being, in fact doxa deals with the aspects of Being where appearance relates to identity and presence and grounded opinion relates to truth and reality. On the other hand the ratio part of the line deals with the non-duals in as much as representable intelligibles relate to order and right, while the non-representable intelligibles relate to good and fate. The sources and root are beyond the limit of the divided line. At the other extreme the infoenergy and spacetime are beyond the other limit. Thus we see how Plato thought of

the divided line as relating to the non-duals, but hidden in the divided line is a deeper indication of the non-duals of emptiness and void and beyond those manifestation. In this way we see that Plato is elaborating on Protagoras' framework of relativity by including pointers to all the different routes of Parmenides. Non-Being is indicated by the lines as discontinuities in the divided line. Being is seen by Plato as indicated by the association of the non-duals with the non-representable intelligibles. Appearance is clearly delineated as part of doxa. But we see that in actuality the extremity of doxa is paradox which is the ultimate nature of Being as the supreme paradox, and the ratio is related to the supra-rationality which indicates the possibility of juxtaposition without mixture which is the nature of the non-dual. When we take all these indications together we see that even the divided line is not complex enough to support the full understanding of the relation between Being and Existence.

What is important for us to realize here is that Plato expands upon the framework of Protagoras and adds to it the necessary elaborations to indicate non-duality as an alternative between the opposites of one and many. Plato gives us hints how to get there from the relativistic realm of appearance in the analogies of the Republic. It is there we must get in order to escape the extreme production of nihilism that occurs in the framework of Protagoras. Nihilism itself is an indicator of the possibility of non-duality. It haunts the speeches in the courts continually despite their nihilism. It appears in the appeals of the Athenians to the higher natures of their fellow citizens. Plato wants to take those indications and give us a way to seize hold of the non-representable intelligibles and use them as a criterion in the judging of cases. In those cases we have a hierarchy of rhetorical modes:

- ?? Indication open-scape (meta/infra-system)
- ?? Description system
- ?? Exposition world
- ?? Narration/Mapping kosmos
- ?? Analysis/Synthesis monad

- ?? Explanation pattern
- ?? Argument domain
- ?? Proof form

If we follow this series up we find that formal proof is the highest type of argument because it forces the opponent to yield, it is like a hammer lock in wrestling. But all the other rhetorical modes are weaker than proof. It is very rare that we can prove a case. More often we are only able to give arguments that could be otherwise, or give explanations, or give narrations of events, or give expositions that aim at the truth, or give descriptions of states of affairs, or perhaps only give indications. These various rhetorical modes draw stronger and stronger consequences. But none of them reach the non-representable intelligibles. They can only be indicated while mathematical representations can be proven. So in some sense these various rhetorical modes operate in the interspace between the representable and non-representable intelligibles, spanning the interspace of emptiness. In a way these rhetorical modes also are what allow us to turn appearances into grounded opinions. Grounded opinions are not yet knowledge because they could be different from what they are. Both doxa and ratio play across the rhetorical modes. But the key point is that proof is related to the schema of form. Systems can be described, Meta-systems can be indicated, and Patterns can be explained. Worlds can be the subject of exposition and Domains are the realm of argumentation. Narration and Mapping can describe the kosmos while Analysis and Synthesis can identify the monads. We might say that the schemas are the implicate order of the logos. As our arguments get stronger heading toward proof we move from one rhetorical mode to another and each has its different organization that makes understanding easier at that level. However, as we will see this implicit organization is much deeper than this. But as a first blush and in attempt to see how the schemas might appear in the courthouse in other than the dimensionality of the things present in the courthouse, then we can think of

Plato and the Development of the Form Schema -- Kent Palmer

the various emergent organizations of the logos as having some relation to the schemas.

Where we see *logic* as the *physus of the logos* we can see the *schemas* as the *logos as the physus*. Our explanations are about the physus, something that has happened in the physical world. If we fall back on logos itself with out reference to the physus then there is still a kind of physus within the logos that is defined by the hard rules of logic which if violated produces fallacies. On the other hand if we consider the logos to be wholly about the physus or happenings related to the physus, then there must be some correspondence within the physus that fits it to the logos. We can see this fittingness in the various types of rhetorical modes that respond to the schematization of the physus that allows it to fit to the logos. Some things we can only indicate because they are vague in the phenomena or too subtle to fully grasp. Other things we can only describe, while other things lend them selves to a kind of exposition that seeks to expose the truth, and so on with the other types of rhetorical modes. Logos adapts itself to the things, by the receptivity in the things to a certain type of logos. This receptivity in the things themselves to the logos is the trace of the schemas. It is this scent of the schemas that we will try to follow in our study of the genealogy of the term schema. But it was important to try to find it in the courtroom. And were we found it was in the attempts of understanding embedded in the logos concerning the phenomena that are fitted to the phenomena themselves. When Husserl says back to the phenomena themselves, we must recognize that the phenomena have a certain receptivity to different sorts of speech about them, and the schemas are the first templates of understanding that allows us to respond to this receptivity of the things to our understanding.

schema	representation	repetition	concerning
pluriverse	indirection	fantasy	reaching beyond
open-scape	indication	camouflage	access / non-access

system	description	dissimulation	Fidelity / non-fidelity
world	exposition	obscurisation	uncovering / covering
kosmos	narration	mapping	time / space
monad	analysis	synthesis	part / whole
pattern	explanation	metamorphosis	grounded / ungrounded
domain	argument	speculation	Consequential / non-consequential
form	proof	dialectic	necessity / impossibility
facet	discrimination	superimposition	subtlety

If we consider the opposites of each rhetorical mode and expand the modes to cover all the schemas as well as asking what each rhetorical mode is concerned with then we get a table like the one above. In other words we expand the rhetorical modes from those identified by Z. K. McKeon² which were just description, exposition, narrative, and argument. But we preserve the idea that they are formally distinguishable but have the same function, and that all rhetorical modes are fictive projections on a persuadable audience. But we introduce a finer resolution to the discrimination of various rhetorical modes, and then we posit that these rhetorical modes exhibit a fittingness to their subject matter, which is projected on the subject matter in order to bring out the intelligibility of the subject matter and thus serve as templates of understanding. We can think of the courtroom speeches as working with the various rhetorical modes in order to persuade the jurors, their fellow citizens, who they believe will be persuaded by what would persuade them as speakers if they were listeners. Thus there is always an element of the attempt to persuade oneself in the persuasion of others, and it is precisely in this self-persuasion that we see the projection a priori of the persuadable audience on the real audience of the other citizens. But persuasion can appeal to many modes which we call the rhetorical modes following Plato and Aristotle in the use of the concept of rhetoric that Plato invented and which did not exist in the concept of the Sophists themselves. Each mode must fit itself to the phenomena described from the most

² McKeon, Zahava Karl, Novels and arguments: inventing rhetorical criticism. (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1982)

subtle to the most flamboyant inventions. Logos is finely articulated in order to fit closely and adapt to the phenomena. This adaptation leads to different degrees of possible understanding and it is these degrees of understanding that appear as the schemas. We posit that they are not a continuous spectrum but instead that they are emergent thresholds each with their own organization that are discontinuously separated from each other. Speech itself must be fitted to these levels of organization projected as a pre-understanding on the phenomena. The reason these are so powerful in persuasion is that they are shared schemas with the other citizens and if we appeal to already shared understandings then it is possible to establish a basis for mutual understanding. It is the pre-ontological shared basis of pre-understanding rooted in the They (What one would say and do, i.e., Das Mann) that is the most powerful foundation for establishing a mutual understanding. Contra Heidegger we can see that the litigants wish to identify wholly with the They, and to become one with it, in order to shelter themselves from the wrath of the jury who represent the They. And because of this the logoi of the court gives us a good grasp of the schemas as they are used in the presentation of the litigant's cases, because each speech is an attempt to submerge into the mutual understanding of what one should think, say and do who is totally immersed in the They. Socrates is the example of authentic Dasein because he was willing to remain separate from the They, and face his death because of his unwillingness to pander to them. But Socrates is the exception to the rule which is that everyone who is forced to be a Dasein wants to re-submerge themselves as quickly as possible into inauthenticity. Because of this each ruse, each appeal, each rhetorical mode can be seen as highlighting what everyone knows and what everyone thinks and what everyone does that is the hallmark of the Athenian Das Mann (They). And because of this it is possible to analyze the speeches to see what each litigant thinks will persuade the jury and thus themselves in the strongest possible way. However, we will not go into this analysis here but instead present our table of rhetorical

modes preemptively in order to get on to the key points which have to do with the way that Socrates according to Plato takes up the arguments of the courtroom outside it in the streets with the Sophists, and how Plato himself uses every mode of rhetoric in order to put across his own case against the sophists and for Socrates. In Plato the entire panoply of rhetorical modes are used in irony. In other words Plato has a parody of the rhetorical modes that are displayed in the courtroom, which makes it impossible to know at any one time when he is serious and when he is joking. He is in a way inverting the place of the litigant in as much as he is pulling away as far as possible from the They (Das Mann) but at the same time doing so in a way that could not be understood as a straightforward rejection of the They who killed his teacher Socrates out of ignorance as well as for other base motives making him a pharmakon. There was always the danger that Plato himself would be painted with the board brush of Sophistry as was his teacher. So it was wise to protect himself by making his work difficult to interpret in a straight forward way. They appeared as conversations between real people that everyone knew. They circulated amongst the elite who could read as a fundamental criticism of Democracy. Yet they were continually under threat from the very court system that they critiqued and thus had to be more subtle so as to avoid direct contradiction of the popular will that ruled the city.

Once you understand that logos itself has rhetorical modes and that these modes are discontinuous templates of organization to which logos appeals, then this striation of the logos into different organizations becomes a way of pre-understanding the phenomena which the phenomena gives itself to in order to be understood, and this is why we call it the logos of the physis. In other words, the physis speaks to us through the templates of understanding projected as the schemas. When we say that we want to go to the phenomena itself we are saying we want to let the voice of

the phenomena speak its own language to us, but that can only occur based on our projection of a pre-ontological understanding and that understanding must be differentiated within itself in order to respond to the phenomena appropriately. This appropriation of the phenomena beforehand by schematization allows us to hear the voice of the phenomena. What we realize is that the phenomena does not have a voice, only we have a voice, but if we want to listen to the voice of the phenomena that is unique to it as is the goal of phenomenology then we must realize that what we are listening to are modulations of our own voice by which the phenomena speak to us through us. So what is at issue is our responsiveness and adaptability, which would be impossible if we did not already have different templates of understanding to project on the phenomena which the phenomena itself could speak through by generating anomalies to our projections. The real voice of the phenomena is when there is a departure of the phenomena from our schematized projections. The phenomena has a second order voice that interrupts our projected templates of understanding. If we do not know what these templates of understanding that we project might be, then we will not recognize the difference between the interruptions of the projected voice and our own voice, which is usually the case. We live in a hermeneutically sealed vessel if we do not recognize the difference between our projected schemas and the anomalies that appear that clash with our projections. Science at its root is the recognition of this clashing and the isolation of the anomalies, and the theorizing about the difference between our projections and the phenomena that appears in spite of our projections.

Understanding as Heidegger deals with it is undifferentiated. What is clear is that this undifferentiated understanding is ultimately impossible. Understanding comes from difference with itself. In other words it is the difference between different templates of

understanding that allows distinctions that are comprehensible to take place. Heidegger discusses about *Befindlichkeit* (discoveredness, disposedness) in relation to moods and *Verstehen* (understanding) in relation to coping as being-in-the-world. The third existential is talk which is the logos itself that we have been discussing in relation to the Athenian courtroom and litigation. We have posited that talk, or the logos is striated into various rhetorical modes that represent different templates of understanding. This means in effect that the understanding must be striated as well and also the moods. In effect, care which is the core of *Dasein* must also be striated by the templates of understanding. Care of *Dasein* must be self-care and self-care must be toward oneself through oneself. How do you care for yourself through yourself unless you have different modes of understanding and different moods which result in different types of talk so that you can be different from yourself in order to know yourself. So the moods come with our discovery that we are already in the world and already disposed to certain types of action in the world. The understandings come with the various ways we have to cope in the world. By coping we mean that we respond to the phenomena as it responds to us and adapt to it as it adapts to us. This adaptation and responsiveness needs different types of templates of understanding that can be applied in our process of coping. As we combine our moods with our understandings we tend to talk as a projection onto the world of our being-in-the-world. That talk or logos itself appears as different rhetorical modes that reflects our embeddedness in the world and our adaptation to it and this is why we find the various rhetorical modes representing both our moods and our pre-ontological understandings. Thus in many ways the thesis presented here is a refinement of the view of Heidegger expressed in Being and Time. He did not see fit to differentiate the moods except to identify anxiety as a fundamental mood that shows groundlessness of *Dasein*. He did not see if to differentiate understanding except to the extent that it refers to familiarity and our coping

skills. He did not see fit to differentiate talk or logos into the rhetorical mode except to differentiate the chatter of the They from serious talk. Here we are attempting to expand on his view of dasein within the openscape (meta/infra-system) of the world by adding the self-differences of schemas from each other as the basis for differentiating understandings, for differentiating moods, for differentiating kinds of talk or logoi as rhetorical modes. It must be emphasized that the moods in this case go back to the Old English use of the word mood that emphasizes the unity of mind and body, and is not the use of mood which has been marginalized as we have it in Modern English today. Mood is something fundamental to the unity of mind and body, just like coping practices are something that cannot be separated from the world in which we practice these coping skills. Similarly talk or logos is not just our speech, it is our speech attuned to the They and which sometimes attains authenticity by separation from the chatter of the They. The core of Dasein where the various existentials overlap is Care (Sorge). It is out of this core that the schemas unfold, it is in our care for the things around us that we project our templates of understanding that treat the things differently as they deserve, and by this stewardship recognizing differences, that we come to know the real differences between the things in their expression of their own differences against our projected schemas. Care for others begins with care for self. Self difference is the beginning of a recognition of a difference in the other from the self. It is the primordial production of self-difference that is the key to our care for ourselves and the other things in the world. That self-difference is first and foremost seen in the different projections of the different schemas that eventually show up in differences in mood and understanding and finally as differences in rhetorical modes of talk. And these rhetorical modes of talk are seen in the courthouse where litigants in most cases desperately attempt to reenter the covering of the They. By the talk of the litigants the jury takes the measure of the men that stand before them as Dasein separated out from the They.

They recognize the order of their speeches, they note who is right and wrong, they sense which side the Good is on, they feel the Fates that are in their hands of the rich and famous within their city as well as all the others. These non-duals show up within the logocentric expression of metaphysics of presence that goes on formally in the trial as the various rhetorical modes are enacted. Plato attempts to draw attention to these non-duals and make them the criterion for the judging of the cases in order to attempt to fend off the extreme nihilism that appears in the courtroom which he believes is the consequence of the work of the Sophists beyond the courtroom. So Socrates goes out to confront the hidden Sophist who is the puppeteer of the litigants within the courtroom and show in his discussions with them that the non-duals are the correct criterion for judging in the cases before the court. Not everything is engulfed in nihilism born of relativism. Rather there are the daimons who have their own non-dual frame of reference which have access to the non-duals and can limit our action by preventing us from doing wrong by departing from following the non-duals just as Socrates is so limited and thus avoids hubris.

Templates of Understanding as Rhetorical Modes

The hypothesis that the Schemas appear as templates of understanding in the guise of rhetorical modes in the Athenian courtroom and in discourse in general has been advanced. This appears by combining the idea that there are three levels of explanation description, explanation and proof related to system, structure and form previously by the author, and the work of Z.K. Mckee who posits four rhetorical modes which are description, exposition, narration, and argument. In the wish to have a rhetorical mode for each schema the table presented above was produced as a hypothesis that combines and extends these two previous approaches to the subject. In essence what is being said here is that the heart of discourse, i.e. its meaning production has

thresholds of comprehension and some phenomena lends itself to each level of understanding. Not everything can be proved which is the highest form of subsumption of any subject. If it cannot be proved perhaps we can give arguments concerning the phenomena, if we cannot offer arguments then perhaps we can at least give explanations. Explanations are dependent on analysis, which is in turn dependent on what shows up in what order, i.e. narrations that appear on the basis of exposition. If we cannot do an exposition, i.e. expose something about something, then at least we can describe it. If we cannot describe it then perhaps we can indicate it, if we are even closed off from indication of it perhaps we can use indirection and indicate something that in a round about way through indirection indicates something about it. In other words, the levels of understanding at the heart of discourse can reach only certain levels of comprehension, and our different modes of discourse adapt to these levels depending on the subject being discussed. At any one time phenomena may resist any higher comprehension and our powers of understanding or expression fail at a certain point, and at those points there are specific thresholds of rhetorical modes that we fall into naturally. Any text can be read as exhibiting all of these rhetorical modes as McKeon said, yet we can formally distinguish them because the thresholds of comprehensibility exist independent of our subject. AS McKeon said these rhetorical modes have one function, which is gaining maximum intelligibility possible, but they have different manifestations in discourse because different subjects lend themselves to different ways of exposition. If we try to prove something that is unprovable then we appear foolish, if we try to argue something which has no consequential structure then we fail to impress our audience, if we try to explain something for which we have no structural explanation then our attempt to make something understandable fails, so we have to fall back to analysis, or narration. Or perhaps we will even fall back to exposition where we attempt to uncover what is covered over, but if we cannot even do exposition then we might try to just

describe the thing of concern. If we cannot describe it then we might just indicate it, or if we cannot indicate it directly then we might try to indicate it indirectly. What is interesting is that this hierarchy of the templates of understanding is inverted for the Chinese. For the West proof is the highest sort of indication, but then it is always based on tautology, and thus for others this might seem to be the most empty way of understanding things. For the Chinese indirect indication is the highest understanding³ and proof is not regarded as interesting. As in many things like the lines of perspective in painting the Chinese way of approaching things is diametrically opposite that of the West. So the rigor of proof from another perspective is the most impoverished and most redundant due to tautology of the methods of comprehension. Here we are not interested in proving that these rhetorical modes are the only ones or that the order is precisely the one described, or even that they are the precise thresholds of understanding that appear in discourse. All this is still an open question. But what we are contending is that in our formal indication, where we began with the scene of the Athenian courtroom arguments of the litigants before the jury, we wondered where the schemas might appear. Now we have a hypothesis that they are at the core of that speech as the thresholds of understanding that appear in the speech itself. Now it is a subject of future research whether all these rhetorical modes exist in the courtroom speeches, whether there are others, whether these rhetorical modes uniquely define thresholds of understanding and that these correspond to the schemas in some formal way. All of this is an open question that would lead us away from our goal which is to dig into the tradition and provide a genealogy of the term schema as it appears in the tradition. We identified a place of entry into the tradition with the work of Protagoras. Then we saw that the court scene and the relation of the sophists to the sychophants was the place where Socrates and Plato began their work of

³ Francois Jullien, Detour and Access (The MIT Press 2000)

questioning the Sophists within the city, making the whole city into a court room, and attempting to make clear the difference between Socrates and Protagoras which Aristophanes could not distinguish and ultimately led to the death of Socrates who was tried before the Athenian court. The whole life of Socrates was defined in terms of his relation to the Sophists, and his difference from them which Plato tries to make clear by defining the non-nihilistic distinction and by introducing the non-duals as a criterion for judging, as well as introducing us to the diamond of Socrates that gives a frame of reference different from the gods and men. Finally we see that Plato's dialogues are the real basis for judging the usefulness of our templates of understanding, because he uses many if not all, or even more rhetorical modes in his dialogues, sprinkled liberally with irony. But we will not even analyze Plato's works for these rhetorical modes, because what is of greater interest is how Plato takes the form schema as the basis for his entire philosophy which was mentioned by Protagoras in relation to the Gods. And what we want to focus on here is the late use of the form schema and its relation to the mathematical and geometrical schemas in the *Timaeus*. It is here that the type of schema that we are focusing on is given its greatest definition within the tradition. It is here where the mathematical and geometrical schemas intrude most clearly into the tradition for the first time. It would be a whole different study to go through the works of Plato and show his every use of the form schema and how he demonstrates the importance of the Special Systems throughout his works. That must be left for another time. What is key to us here is that we can see that Plato comes to a late formulation of the form theory that includes its interaction of spacetime receptacle and that in this interaction the mathematical and geometric schemas are defined. Once they are defined then we can use them to look back on the articulation of logos into rhetorical modes and for other uses. We are concentrating on the place where the geometrical and mathematical schemas come most to the fore so we can attempt to grab hold of them and then work out

their implications once we understand their structure. We cannot easily work from the articulation of discourse to the mathematical and geometrical schemas. But we can find where the mathematical and geometrical schemas are rigorously defined by Plato and then once we understand this definition attempt to work back to the articulation of discourse and understand that in light of the existence of the geometrical and mathematical schemas. This is a round about path but many times when we work out a phenomena using formal indication of Heidegger it is precisely this kind of round about route that must be followed in order to gain access to a phenomena that is hiding itself from us effectively.

Timaeus and the Introduction of the Mathematical and Geometrical Form Schema

What really needs to be done is to consider the Timaeus within the compass of the entirety of the dialogues, but when we consider carefully it is clear that we cannot here deal with even the whole of the Timaeus because of its complexity. Therefore there is a conflict between the need to fully understand the schemas as they appear in Plato and the constraints of space and time with respect to our genealogy. Plato's work is a vast labyrinth but very important to the development of the form schema, because in his work is a whole evolution of his own understanding of the ontology of forms that can be seen in the work of A. Silverman⁴. But it is in the Timaeus where Plato for the first time introduces a way for the ethereal forms to interact with bodies through the introduction of the receptacle. The receptacle is space. Just prior to that he introduces time separately. But the receptacle is the place where the transformation of the elements into each other is effected. It is in the receptacle that we get the differentiation of the two sorts of triangle at the structural level that produce the forms of the Platonic Solids

⁴ Silverman, Alan; The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics (Princeton UP 2002)

(regular polytopes). The distinction between triangles and solids is perhaps the first structural explanation offered in our tradition. The way that the different elements are transformed from one to the other is given though positing this structural level which will allow the solids to be broken up and reconstituted. But what is important to us at this juncture is the fact that the Form schema is represented as two and three dimensional figures. And it is through the interrelation between these figures that change is explained. And furthermore it is by the construction of the three dimensional figures that the abstract forms as ideas which are the models are allowed to participate within space and time represented by the receptacle in order to create the appearances and sensations of concrete things that are built around an ideal form. So when Plato says that there are three ontological classes: ideal models, the receptacle, and the concrete sensations and appearances that are changeable we are seeing here a working out of the Protagorean Framework in such a way that it can explain how change and changelessness can be grasped at the same time which Plato says in the Sophist is the goal. In other words for us to bring together the intelligible and the sensual appearances there needs to be a third thing which is the receptacle of space. This receptacle is where the triangles and solids of the elements appear as embodiments of the ideal forms of the elements. The structural level of triangles allows us to explain how change between elements occurs. But the receptacle itself acts as a system, because it approximates a living creature which is the whole of the kosmos. This whole creature is seen as autonomous. But within it change occurs by structural changes based on triangles where different Platonic solids turn into each other. The point is that the ideal forms which hitherto have been separated from the sensory things which they some how pattern giving rise to a relation between Being and Becoming, is brought together by the non-dual of the spacetime receptacle. But that embodiment improves on the theory of Empedocles of the elements by supplying the structural level and

the system level of schematization that are adjacent to the form level. But the forms are not just the ideal forms in Being nor are they just the appearances of sensual forms of concrete particulars, rather there is a third type of form which is the form of the elements that allow the ideal forms to participate in embodied existence. This participation occurs when the solids are created from the triangles as a place for the ideal forms of the elements to participate in the places created in the receptacle. But change is made possible by the structural deconstruction and reconstruction of the solids into triangles. Yet wholeness is made possible by the fact that the kosmos is considered a whole living creature like an organism which according to Rescher is the root metaphor for the system. It is an example of the framework of Protagoras because all three ways of Parmenides are brought together. The route the becoming of sensory appearance is seen as the concrete things that imitate the ideal source forms. The route of the Being of the source forms appear as the idealized source forms themselves that are models that the appearances follow. And then there is the receptacle which is introduced as a non-dual. Other non-duals such as order, fate, right are mentioned earlier in the Timaeus. Spacetime is a non-dual as well here between the ideal realm and the realm of sensory appearances. Non-Being in this case as existence is what separates the non-dual from the duality of the ideal world of knowledge and the sensory world of opinion. The whole way that the receptacle is introduced lets us know that it has a special status. It is only through the intermediary non-dual can the duals of the ideal world of intelligibility and the sensory world of opinions and appearances can communicate with each other. This intermediary realm allows the ideal source forms enter into the concrete changeable things and participate in them. It allows us to have change and changelessness at the same time. But our point here is that this is effected by embodying the ideas of the elements within forms that are dimensional, i.e. the two dimensional triangles at the structural level and the three dimensional regular polytopes at the level of solid things which are spaces that might

contain the elemental ideas and embody them. It turns out that the form schema is indeed tied to two and three dimensionality, and our key finding in our research is that every schema is tied to two dimensions as every dimension is in turn tied to two schemas. Schemas and dimensions are different from each other and it is this dimensional connection which is geometrical and algebraic that allows us to formally separate the schemas from each other. We can extend this idea to higher and lower dimensions and thus distinguish formally the different schemas in our hierarchy. This is merely an extension of what Plato says in the Timaeus, a following out of the argument presented there. It is geometrical because each dimension is generated by their minimal platonic solid (regular polytope) that is produced by the the unfolding of the Pascal Triangle. It is algebraic and thus mathematical because it is only by algebra that we know the shape of higher dimensional solids. As Descartes later discovered these two ways of looking at things are complementary. Plato of course did not know that, he was thinking entirely geometrically and he was not concerned with any other schema than that of form. But what he got right was the fact that form is both two and three dimensional, and that this dimensionality expressed itself in the spacetime of the receptacle, and through this non-dual interspace the duals of the ideal Being level of idealized forms and the sensory appearances of changeable opinions could communicate secretly with each other via the embodiment of the elements in mathematical and geometrical forms. Here is where the concept of the schema in the sense that we are interested in exploring enters fully into the tradition. It takes up and renews the framework of Protagoras by embodying all three routes of Parmenides. It shows how the idealized source forms of things become embodied in sensory appearances about which we form beliefs and opinions. It defines the non-dual interspace between the dualities of Being and Becoming and allows us to grasp change and changlessness at the same time which itself is a supra-rational concept. This concept of the receptacle became the absolutes

of space and time as the projection of human beings in Kant, and eventually became the monolith of spacetime/timespace with Einstein. But at this point what is clear is that the mathematical and geometrical schemas are the point of embodiment of unchanging source forms in the changeable things of this world. In effect the elements as ideas themselves are given spaces of participation in embodiment within the mathematical and geometrical forms of the regular polytopes, but that these solid forms are made up structurally of triangles that explain their capacity for change. The schemas in the sense we want to use the term is very precisely positioned in the Timaeus as the point at which Becoming and Being intersect. They intersect where the ideas of the elements enter into embodiment within the places of the platonic solids associated with those elements. And the two dimensional triangles are the means by which change is effected in these stable and seemingly unchangeable forms of the embodied elements. At this point the term schema in the sense we wish to focus on comes entirely into the tradition. That of course needs to be seen in relation to the entire dialogue and the entire corpus of Plato's thought. But it is evident that there is a certain precision to the presentation within the Timaeus of the schema as a solution to this problem of participation of the ideal world in the mundane world.

Timaeus is a dialogue about the Kosmos. But we can attempt to read it back into our problematic that has to do with the court room. Representable and Non-representable intelligibles are continuously appealed to in the courtroom battles. The Timaeus wants to show us how the ideal intelligibles come to participate in the sensory appearances that lead to opinion and belief. By presenting this in terms of the Kosmos, it follows that it must be true of the human level of concern as well. If all of the kosmos is one living creature then all the participants in the courtroom scene are part of this creature. The Timaeus builds up the picture of how human beings arise out of the kosmos as the ones who have intellect and can see the

eternal ideal forms. Critas goes on to show that Ancient Athens was on the form of the Republic sketched by Socrates. It tells of the war between the Dissiaptive Ordering special system (Athens and the Republic) against the Reflexive Social special system (Atlantis) so that the extremes are defined against which the city of the Laws (Magnesia) which is autopoietic symbiotic can be defined and differentiated. By understanding the relation between these several special forms of cities then the citizens can understand better the relation to each other of the non-duals which they can use as a criteria for making judgments. So the Timaeus appears far distant from the courtrooms of Athens describing the Kosmos and the origin of man. But that origin of man is set in a framework of cities that describe the special systems which in turn can be seen as being distinguished within the courtroom itself as the differences between the various socially defined players in the drama of the cases. In fact, Socrates himself after giving the speeches of the Republic says right at the beginning of the Timaeus that he would like to see his city brought to life. In other words he would like to move from Pure Being (Being as such) to Process Being (Becoming as such). The story of ancient Athens and Atlantis at war is the story of the becoming in history of the Republic that Socrates created as a thought experiment, in order to introduce the non-duals. The Timaeus stands in the interspace between Being and Becoming and within it the Receptacle stands in the interspace between Ideal Being and Becoming of Appearances. And within the receptacle at the center is the form schema represented as two and three dimensional embodiments of elements. The dimensionality of the form schema is the fulcrum that the structure of these dialogues depend upon in order to bring the ideal source forms into embodiment within the realm of sensory appearances. You cannot have a courtroom without men constituted in the kosmos. The fact that men are concrete things that appear in space and time and that they are also both changeable and built on the plans of unchangeable ideal source forms is an

important context for understanding what is happening in the courtroom, especially if you want those within the courtroom to use non-duals as a criteria for judging cases. It is a round about move to bring in the concerns of cosmology, but none the less it is an important stage setting move. Especially if you want to introduce the ideal city of the gods in contrast to the city of hubris in Atlantis. Athens itself was a sea power like Atlantis and was in fact waging war far from home in Sicily which lost for them the Peloponnesian War. If we want Athens to return to the right track and withdraw from the Sea to become like Megara then we need to show Athens an image of what happens when the mind is separated from the body, as we see in the Republic. From there we can move toward reintegration with the production of new laws as those created for Magnesia. The diagnosis of the ills of Athens goes to great lengths to construct models of ideal cities on the form of the special systems in order to explicate the internal structure of each of the special systems that appear in the courtroom as its litigants and jury. Plato and Socrates turn the polis into a courtroom, but they also turn the actors in the courtroom into cities so as to explore the inner constitution of each type of special system that appears in the courtroom. It is a thorough and deep analysis of the ills of the Athenian city and its courts that produces nihilism and is haunted by the excluded figure of the sophist who teaches sycophancy. The depth of the analysis cannot be explored here because of limitations on our argument. But the key point is the entry as a fulcrum of the argument of the concept of the geometrical and mathematical schemas into the Western Tradition. It is this concept that we want to follow as it matures in the systems of thought of Aristotle and Kant and Heidegger.

An important point too is that the schemas enter the tradition as geometrical and mathematical structures tied to dimensionality on the side of Physis. But as we have seen they can also be seen as the rhetorical modes on the side of Logos. In this way we can see that the schemas

are themselves non-dual structures because they participate on both sides of the Physus/Logos duality. They are in fact types of ordering. They are an ordering of speech about things, but they are also an ordering of the possible shapes and internal constitution of things themselves as we perceive them in the first instance as our own a priori projections. Recognizing that the schemas are both templates of understanding that appear in speech as rhetorical modes but also that appear in physus as a preordering of our experience of the things is crucial for comprehending the role of the schemas. The schemas are a means of our responsiveness to the things that preorders our ways of talking about them and our way of perceiving them. Breaking out of that preordering is called science, but science is for the most part dominated by our projections and only with great effort do we go beyond those projections. Knowing our own capacity for projection is a first step in going beyond those projections. Recognizing their pervasiveness and strength is crucial in our attempt to allow the phenomena to speak in its own voice, and thus interrupt our chatter about it which does not reach what is essential in it beyond our projections.

Striations of both hazardous Physus and the deflections of Logos

One of the questions that comes up is how rhetorical modes and schemas such as the form schema that Plato introduces and the others can relate to dimensionality. One way to think about this is to look at the work of Haddon⁵

“Haddon originated the concept that harmful effects of energy transfer are commonly controlled by one

⁵ Haddon, William Jr.; "Energy Damage and the Ten Counter-Measure Strategies," Human Factors Journal, August 1973.

or more of a succession of measures or barriers. These barriers are:

- 1. Prevent the marshaling (do not produce or manufacture the energy)*
- 2. Reduce the amount, e.g., voltages, fuel storage*
- 3. Prevent the release (strength of energy containment)*
- 4. Modify the rate of release, e.g., slow down burning rate, speed*
- 5. Separate in space or time, e.g., electric lines out of reach*
- 6. Interpose material barriers, e.g., insulation, guards, safety glasses*
- 7. Modify shock concentration surfaces, e.g., round off and make soft*
- 8. Strengthen the target, e.g., earthquake-proof structures*
- 9. Limit the damage, e.g., prompt signals and action, sprinklers*
- 10. Rehabilitate person and objects⁶”*

<u>schema</u>	<u>Rhetorical Modes</u>	<u>Guess at the allocation of Hazard Prevention mechanisms</u>
pluriverse	indirection	10. Rehabilitate person and objects
open-scape	indication	1. Prevent the marshaling (do not produce or manufacture the energy)
system	description	2. Reduce the amount, e.g., voltages, fuel storage
world	exposition	4. Modify the rate of release, e.g., slow down burning rate, speed
kosmos	narration	5. Separate in space or time, e.g., electric lines out of reach
monad	analysis	6. Interpose material barriers, e.g., insulation, guards, safety glasses
pattern	explanation	3. Prevent the release (strength of energy containment)
domain	argument	9. Limit the damage, e.g., prompt signals and action, sprinklers

⁶ <http://tis.eh.doe.gov/analysis/trac/29/trac29.html>

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form	proof	8. Strengthen the target, e.g., earthquake-proof structures
facet	discrimination	7. Modify shock concentration surfaces, e.g., round off and make soft

There is no doubt that Haddon's ten ways to avoid hazard from energy transfer concerns the physus. It is interesting to read these ten ways of avoiding exposure to energy hazard in relation to the schemas and the rhetorical modes. If we start with the openscape, we notice that it has to do with resources and allocation of resources one of which could be energy. If we prevent the meta-system from marshaling a standing reserve of energy then that will prevent a hazard from occurring. This prevents the hazard by preventing something else, i.e. the accumulation of energy. Thus indirection is involved in this method of preventing hazard. Next if we move to the system then Haddon would have us reduce the amount of the hazard, and this assumes that we can describe the amount of the hazard. A system is a set of relations between things, and part of those relations could be seen in the relation of amounts of one thing in relation to another thing. Reducing the amount assumes that it is reduced in relation to something else and therefore assumes a system view of the hazard. Next we consider modifying the release of the hazard. Release of the hazard assumes something like exposition, because all expositions are the exposing of something in relation to an observer. Rates of exposing of something to the observer may differ. Like the rates of exposing a hazard to the observer. Worlds appear on the basis of exposing of things to observers, such as dasein the world exposer, or discloser. Rates of disclosing are like rates of exposition. Kosmos assumes that it includes everything in time and space. These are seen in logos as narratives or mappings, and Haddon says we can isolate the target from the hazard in time and space and thus prevent the target from being hit by the energy of the hazard. Next we consider the rhetorical mode of analysis, this is very similar to Haddon's concept of interposing barriers between the target and the hazard. Analysis produces

invisible barriers between parts of the thing analyzed. And that produces monads at what ever level of reduction we are discussing. The next rhetorical mode is explanation. With explanations we go down to a lower level of modeling phenomena to explain the higher level of phenomena, and especially discontinuities at the higher level. These discontinuities in the phenomena at the higher level are like the prevention of the release of the hazard. In other words the hazard at the higher level is controlled by something like a valve at the lower level so that release is stopped which is an introduction of a discontinuity in flow at the higher level of abstraction. Explanations stop the hazard of questioning too far. They put a stop to exploration by offering reasons why such and such is so and so. Thus reason does not seek any further answer and so an explanation is the introduction of a discontinuity in the exploration process which looks for a reason why things are as they are. Explanations appeal to a lower level of patterning to explain discontinuities at the formal level. Explanations introduce stopping places for our questioning. Explanations attempt to proved grounds in the face of our groundlessness. The next schema is the domain, which is related to a discipline in which there are many arguments that go on between different theories of phenomena. Arguments seek to limit the damage to a specific theory by proposing ways of thinking about the theory that save it from the anomalies that threaten it. Arguments attempt to limit the damage to theories and thus they are like the attempt to limit damage to a target from a hazard source. The hazard source in this context is the criticism of the proponents of other theories. The next schema is the form schema which allows the highest level of explanatory power which is proof. Proofs attempt to strengthen the target, i.e. the form, from the hazard of skepticism. After proof we fall off the edge of the our explanatory ladder and we find there the facet schema. We discriminate the facets of things that cannot ultimately be separated in to discreet things like monads or ultimately forms. But faceting is like the modification of the

surfaces of the target to that the hazard shock does not concentrate on the surfaces. This rounding of the surfaces under shock is like faceting. It is something that occurs at extreme pressures but which reduces the incidence of the shock on the target by modifying the drag coefficients on the target surface. At the other extreme we see the pluriverse, which is really different possible worlds. We can only get indications of what these are like by indirection. Here the possible worlds are like the crash dummies which have gone through the various crashes and then are repaired. In other words this is an after the fact look at hazard, while all the other prevention mechanisms are before the fact. Thus there is a radical difference between these forms of repair from the forms of prevention beforehand. The radical difference of after the fact repair and prevention is similar to the radical difference between the real world and possible worlds in a pluriverse. It takes into scope all possible destructive testing effects and the possible repairs that might be undertaken. What might go wrong is tested and we see the many possible scenarios where things did go wrong in order to understand future possible destruction by the same hazard. Allowing all hazards to manifest to see what they will do and how we will repair them is a far cry from preventing the hazard from occurring in the process by preventing the standing reserve from being formed.

If we look closely at Haddon's prevention of the harmful effects of energy transfer we can see that it brings out the various ways that things can relate to energy within the physus. We can speculate that the rhetorical modes are something like this scale within the logos. In other words we can interpret the hazards and the target in such a way that they make sense in relation to the rhetorical modes and the schemas. The rhetorical modes appears as the striations of the logos while the hazard modes appears as the striations of the physus in regard to energy harming humans, and finally the schemas appear as something between these two which is related to ordering and is thus

non-dual in its intrinsic nature. If we accept this tentative analogy between hazard prevention and rhetorical modes we can see that in the courtroom the litigant who is the defendant is attempting to prevent hazards that might come from the decision of the court from harming him. He as a Dasein is trying every possible way to cope with the confrontation with Das Mann who will decide his fate. Harm is coming toward him from Das Mann and he is trying every possible way to deflect that harm. So it makes sense that the possible ways of deflecting harm from Das Mann should be analogous to the possible ways of prevention of energy hazards to humans that Haddon discovers. But what is amazing is that these two manifestations of striations in the physus and the logos is rooted in a more fundamental differentiation of space and time in the form of the dimensional relations between the schemas. In other words the space and time of the courtroom is charged and has its places which are differentiated by the dimensionality of the things that appear in the clearing of the courtroom. The courtroom is not just homogeneous space but a series of places of different dimensionality that are organized according to the schemas. It is this organization which is finite that underpins and gives a basis for the striation of the physus and logos both. We must open up the space with its striation into places before we can perceive the hazard coming toward coping dasein from Das Mann of the jury. Dasein sees himself as being-with his accuser before the jury. The prosecutor is the source of the energy of harm which the jury could deflect. We use our speech as we can to respond to Das Mann and seek refuge under its cloak. The deflection of harm corresponds to the modalities of hazard, and it seems only natural that if there are truly ten types of harm as mirrored in the physus, then there would be ten modes of deflection in logos. But this striation would be founded on a more primitive striation that would be based in the opening up of the space itself within which the hazard could appear and its deflection could occur. All this is merely speculative but it underlines the necessity for understanding better the schemas

that underlay the opening up of spacetime in different orders that might be appropriated so as to understand both the space of harm and the ways of deflecting that harm in the logos as is possible in court but few other places.